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FORUM

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS I1V ENGRVEERLNG:
THE CtL4LLENGER AND CORPORATE CULTURE
Joseph G. Ferrante

INTRODUCTION
Ethics in engineering is an important issue that affects the daily lives of almost everyone in the world. Because
engineers and related scientists design, develop, and manufacture the many products that the public-at-large uses or
consumes on a daily basis, it is in the best interest of all concerned that engineers be held to high ethical standards. This
paper will reflect on the corporate culture issues involved in ethics in engheaing, and specifically how corporate culture
can affect ethical engineering and how it did in the case of the Challenger disaster.

GENERAL DISCUSSION
While it is important to understand the events
surrounding the Challenger disaster, and particularly the
recollection of the engineer involved, Roger Boisjolay, the
events will not be recounted here, as most of the events
have become common knowledge in the aviationlaerospace
communities. However, there is a more important question
at hand to discuss: what role does corporate culture play in
engineering ethics?
According to a leading researcher in the field of
ethics in engineering, engineers have a responsibility that
goes f&rbeyond the building of machines and
systems. This researcher observes that this cannot be left to
the technical illiterates, or even to literate and overloaded
technical administrators to decide what is safe and for the
public good (McDonald 10).
As all of us as professionals know, we must tell
what we know, first through normal administrative
channels, but when these fail, through whatever avenueswe
can find. Many claim that it is disloyal to protest.
Sometimes the penalty disapproval, loss of status, even
vilification-can be severe. The fkct that people are in a
hierarchy tends to amplify misperceptions. A low-level
person has a k r that something might happen and
reports it to a higher level. As it goes up the
hierarchy, information gets distorted, usually to reflect the
interests of the managers (Bell and Esch 50).
By their very natures, corporateculturestend to try
to ignore the unpleasant, a situation that can only be

counterbalanced by deliberately creating a culture that
encourages peopleto bring up unpleasant information. One
such philosophy, developed by The Boeing Company, is
called 'Working Together." Working together is an idea
that evaporates if you think too hard about it, but it seems
to have a fierce power that can inspire men and women.
Working Together is a point of conflict to begin
with. An engineer with pride tends to want to h d
solutions to his problems. And it's against nature to go out
publicly and explore the particular problems that an
engineer faces (Sabbagh 66). Working Together anbodies
that very notion that goes against the in-grained nature of
engineering. Working Together teaches engineers that
attention can be given to a particular problem, by making
it all right to express your problems. The belief that no one
person can find a solution as easily as a large group is the
cornerstone principle of "Working Together."
In a group trying to move ahead with a decision,
you find that those people that have anything negative to
say are unpopular, so a manager deliberately has to
encourage people taking the devil's advocate position. In a
crisis situation, such as the Challenger case, somebody has
got to think about the possibilityof something going wrong,
and to use a worst-case scenario approach, as Roger
Boisjoly did in predicting that there would be loss of life on
the launch pad.
Corporate cultures that do not embrace close
working relationships such as Boeing's, tend to ''kill the
messenger" bearing the bad news rather than punish those
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directly responsible for a consequence. And while it is
generally thought that this culture is the result of managers,
it becomes apparent that it is all too often the result of line
workers. In these types of situations, people who "hang
tough" with their organization tend to do very well, in the
fundamental belief that not protesting is highly valued and
that the very organization they may have doubts about will
always protect them.
Unfortunately, these same people tend not to use
acceptable risk analysis in determining what is right and
what is wrong. And in engineering, this can be a deadly
combination. As Roger Boisjoly himselfstated, "More than
20 years ago I received some superb advice fiom a QA
(quality assurance)manager that I have applied throughout
my career. He told me to ask myselfthe following question
when fkced with a tough question of whether a product was
acceptable: 'Would you allow your wife or children to use
this product without any reservations?' If I could not
answer that question with an unqualified, 'Yes,' he said, I
should not sign off on the product for others to use. That is
what ethical analysis of acceptable risk should be,"
(Boisjoly 1 1).
Yet,it is this very, correct belief that ended Roger
Boisjoly's career with his employer, Morton-Thiokol, in the
wake of the Challenger disaster. As a result of his
testimony before Congress regarding problems with
Challenger's design, Roger Boisjoly was isolated fiom the
rest of his colleagues in the belief that his very testimony
was causing more harm than good to Morton-Thiokol, a
belief championed by none other than the Chief Executive
m c e r of Morton-Thiokol himself
This brings up an interesting notion commonly
believed in the corporateworld, that companyculture stems
fiom top management and "fans out" to the rank and file
below. It must be noted, however, that even with a culture
stemming fiom the top, it is often hard to change the minds
of workers on the line, who might be used to the "old-way"
of doing things. However, with quality such an important
issue in any business, it seems as if that trend is changing.
Many people want to work in a non-hostile, open
environment. The more people that get involved with that

type of attitude, the easier it becomes to break down the
barriers of the few that dismiss "new age" working
environments (Sabbagh 66).
The author of this paper, himself a Chief
Executive Officer, considers this such an important item,
that employees are considered a "strategic asset" with his
company, and as such are included in the strategic plan,
which indicates that his company wishes to "attract
energetic, dedicated, and good-spirited employees and
compensate them above industry standards," (Jet
Development Group, Inc.). While this does not expressly
addressthe notion of capmate culture, the inference drawn
is that employees are the most important assets that any
company has, and as such those employees have a right to
share in the management and direction the company takes.
And while the corporate culture put in place by
Boeing and others has had tremendous e&d, especially in
the engineering world, it is of interesting note what the
corporate culture of Morton-Thiokol has gained: nothing.
The fate of Morton-Thiokol? They are out of business.
CONCLUSION
The research on the subject of whistleblowers
leads to two conclusions. First, that whistleblowers tend to
achieve problem resolution through their organizational
chain of command. And second, in almost every case they
are punished by the organkition after whistleblowing
outside of the organization. Nowhere was this more
evident than in the Challenger disaster and the MortonThiokol engineer, Roger Boisjoly.
Today we need more critical pronouncementsand
declarations by engineers in high professional
responsibilities. In some instances, such criticism must be
severe if we are properly to serve mankind and preserve our
fieedom. Hence it is of the utmost importance that we
maintain our fieedom of communication in the
engineering profession and to the public. Perhaps if the
engineering community had followed this advice fifteen
years ago, Challenger and her seven crew-members might
still be flying, exploring the unknown space beyond our
surly bonds of Earth. Instead, little remains but ashes.0
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